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CASE COMMENTS
due process hearing requirements or it will serve as a vehicle for
far reaching changes in the state's regulatory scheme.
Stephen R. Crislip
Constitutional Law-Evidence--Use of Miranda-
violative Confessions for Impeachment Purposes
Defendant Harris was charged with the sale of dangerous drugs.
After being taken into custody, he made self-incriminating statements
to the police prior to being warned of his right to appointed counsel.
These statements were conceded by the prosecution to be in violation
of the constitutional requirements set forth in Miranda v. Arizona.'
However, there was never any contention by the defendant that the
statements were coerced or involuntary.
At trial, an undercover agent testified that Harris had sold him
heroin on two separate occasions. The prosecution, however, made no
attempt to use Harris" incriminating statements in its case in chief.
Harris later took the witness stand in his own defense and denied
making the sale to the undercover agent on the first occasion. He
admitted making a sale on the second occasion but asserted that
the glassine envelope sold to the undercover agent contained only
baking powder. On cross-examination, Harris was confronted with
his illegally obtained prior contradictory statements, in which he had
admitted to obtaining narcotics on two different occasions.' The trial
court instructed the jury that these statements were to be used only
for the purpose of assessing the defendant's credibility as a witness
and not as substantive evidence of his guilt. On appeal, Harris con-
tended that the illegally obtained statements could not be used by the
state to impeach his credibility. Held: Conviction affirmed. A state-
ment taken from an accused in violation of Miranda but otherwise
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that the defendant be given
the following warnings: "He [the defendant] must be warned prior to
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning .... ." Id. at 479. The Miranda decision
permits the courts to avoid determination of whether or not a defendant's
statements are voluntary by prescribing stringent procedural requirements
which must be met before the statements are admissible.
I The essence of the prior statements "read in the presence of the jury
is twofold: (1) on January 4, 1966 defendant acted as the undercover police
officer's agent in obtaining narcotics and (2) on January 2, 1966 defendant
obtained narcotics from an unknown person outside a bar and then sold
the drugs to the undercover agent .... ' People v. Harris, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245,
247 (1969).
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satisfying legal standards of trustworthiness is admissible to impeach
the defendant's credibility as a witness. Every criminal defendant is
privileged to testify in his own defense, but having voluntarily taken
the witness stand, he is under an obligation to speak truthfully. Im-
peachment of the defendant's credibility with prior inconsistent state-
ments is merely one of the traditional truth-testing devices of the
adversary system, and the safeguards provided by Miranda do not
include the right to use perjury as a defense. Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
The Court, in the majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger, held
that the language in Miranda which indicated a bar to the use of
uncounseled statements for all purposes was dictum,' and limited
the holding in Miranda to bar the use of uncounseled statements by
the prosecution only in making its substantive case. The majority
relied upon the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Walder v. United States4 to reach the result in the Harris case. In
Walder the Court held that physical evidence which had been illegally
seized could be used to impeach the defendant's direct testimony on
matters "collateral" to the accusations contained in the indictment.
The evidence which was admitted to impeach the defendant in
Walder related to a crime with which the defendant had been charged
two years earlier and was not directly related to the elements of the
crime then at bar.' The Court in Harris seemed to adopt the basic
rationale of the majority in Walder:
3 Those statements dismissed by the court as dicta are: '"he warnings
required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are,
in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissi-
bility of any statement made by defendant .... The privilege against self-
incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate
himself in any manner;... [Sitatements merely intended to be exculpatory by
the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial . . . . These
statements are incriminating in any sense of the word and may not be used
without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other state-
ment." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-477 (1966). The Court
further provided: "[U]nless and until such warnings and waiver are demon-
strated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of inter-
rogation can be used against him." Id. at 479.
4 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
1 In 1950 Walder had been indicted for the purchase and possession of
heroin. He was granted a motion to suppress the introduction into evidence
of the illegally seized narcotics, forcing the Government to discontinue
prosecution. Two years later, Walder was again indicted for a completely
unrelated narcotics violation. Testifying in his own defense he made the
sweeping assertion that he had never in his life possessed narcotics. On cross-
examination he denied that law enforcement officers had seized narcotics from
his home two years earlier, whereupon the government was permitted to
introduce the testimony of one of the officers who had been involved in the
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It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make
an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is
quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal
method by which evidence in the Government's possession
was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself
with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.6
The Court admitted that Walder was impeached on collateral matters
whereas Harris was impeached on matters more directly related to the
charges against him, but found that there is no difference in principle
between impeachment on matters collateral to the elements of the
crime and impeachment on matters bearing directly on the elements
of the crime.
7
Dismissing the contention of many legal scholars that the
total exclusion of illegally obtained confessions is necessary to deter
illegal police conduct,8 the majority reasoned that the unavailability
of such confessions in the prosecution's substantive case is a sufficient
deterrent in itself to illegal police activity:
The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided
valuable aid to the jury in assessing petitioner's credibility,
and the benefits of the process should not be lost, in our
view, because of the speculative possibility that impermis-
sible police conduct will be encouraged thereby. Assuming
that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on pro-
scribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the
evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution
in its case in chief.9
8401 U.S. at 224. The Court in Harris was quoting directly from its
language in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. at 65.
7 Mr. Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Harris that the Court, in
Walder, was careful to distinguish the situation where the defendant is im-
peached on collateral matters from the situation where the defendant is
impeached on matters directly related to the elements of the charges against
him. In Walder the Court declared: "Of course the Constitution guarantees
a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He
must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby
giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence ille-
gally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief." 347 U.S.
at 65 (emphasis supplied). Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority
in Harris, apparently ignored this possible declaration of policy and attempted
to reconcile Walder with the result reached in Harris.8 See e.g., T. ABBOT, J. CRATSLEy, S. ENGcELBERG, D. GROVE, P. MANAHAN,
B. SAYPOL, LAW Am) TAcncs iN EXCLUSIONARY HEAwNGS, 9-10 (1969);
Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 H1Av. L. Rav. 938, 1030 (1966);
Wolfe, A Survey of the Expanded Exclusionary Rule, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
193, 236 (1963); Note, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules,
34 U. CmI. L. REV. 939,945-46 (1967); 42 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 772, 775 (1967).
9 401 U.S. at 225.
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Harris, six federal
courts of appeal and the appellate courts of thirteen states had
interpreted the Miranda decision to require the exclusion of un-
counseled statements for impeachment purposes, while only four
courts, including the New York Court of Appeals in Harris, had
allowed impeachment of the defendant's direct testimony by his
illegally obtained prior statements." The view had prevailed among
legal scholars that certain dicta"1 in Miranda required the total
exclusion of uncounseled statements by the accused, notwithstanding
the impeachment exception in Walder.'2 Prior to Harris, such dicta
furnished the principal basis for the refusal of most courts to permit
impeachment with illegally obtained confessions, but numerous under-
lying justifications were also advanced in support of that result.
The justifications were of two types: (1) those pointing out the
distinctions between exclusion of illegal confessions and exclusion
of physical evidence violating the fourth amendment, and (2) those
attacking the impeachment exception in the context of the general
considerations underlying all the exclusionary rules.' 3 Included in
10 Cases contra Harris: United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968);
United States v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1968); Breedlove v. Beto,
404 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1968); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172
(9th Cir. 1968); Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1967);
Blair v. United States, 401 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. Barry, 237
Cal. App. 2d 154, 46 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Dist. Ct. 1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1024 (1967); Velarde v. People, 466 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1970); State v. Galasso,
217 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1968); People v. Luna, 37 Ill. 2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586
(1967); Franklin v. State, 6 Md. App. 572, 252 A.2d 487 (1969); People v.
Wilson, 20 Mich. App. 410, 174 N.W.2d 79 (1969); Kelly v. King 196 So. 2d
525 (Miss. 1967); State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86, 171 S.E. 2d 398 (1970); State
v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968); Spann v.
State, 448 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969); Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 209
Va. 412, 164 S.E.2d 699 (1968); Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150
N.W.2d 370 (1967). Cases in accord with Harris: State v. Kimbrough, 109
N.J. Super. 57, 262 A.2d 232 (1970); State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55,
249 N.E.2d 818 (1969); State v. Grant, 459 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1969).
11 See note 3 supra.
12 e.g., T. ABBOT, supra note 8, at 18. Note, The Collateral Use Doctrine:
Fron Walder to Miranda, 62 Nw. U. L. REV. 912, 933 (1968); 42 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 772, 774 (1967).
13 "[Tlhe criminal law now clearly recognizes at least six rules of
exclusion. These are the rules based on the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments to the federal Constitution and those grounded in rule 5 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title 18 U.S.C. § 3109 and § 605 of
the Federal Communications Act. In addition, less well known and accepted
is the exclusionary rule grounded in the due process clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments." T. ABBOT, supra note 8, at 23. Subsequent to the
publication of the above-cited authority, the Supreme Court in Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), added to the list of exclusionary rules by
holding that testimony given by the defendant at a preliminary hearing on the
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the first category is the contention that the impeachment exception is
inappropriate to illegal confessions because the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is directed by its terms at exclusion
of involuntary confessions and the use of an involuntary confession
for the purpose of impeachment compels the defendant to be a
"witness" against himself much the same as it would if used in the
prosecution's substantive case. 4 On the other hand, the impeach-
ment exception is not on its face inappropriate to the privilege against
illegal search and seizure because the fourth amendment is directed
at protection of the privacy interest. Moreover, Miranda was designed
to avoid the necessity of determining whether confessions are volun-
tary and reliable, by prescribing certain police conduct. The ad-
mission of illegal confessions for the purpose of impeachment returns
to the courts the necessity of making this determination, because the
court has retained the requirement of trustworthiness."5
The second category attacks the impeachment exception as ap-
plied to all of the exclusionary rules. If the defendant asserts his right
to testify in his own defense, he is penalized by the introduction of
illegal evidence for the purpose of impeachment. However, if he
refuses to take the witness stand because he fears that his testimony
The fourth amendment exclusionary rule prevents use of evidence obtained
as a result of illegal search and seizure, whether tangible or intangible; and
the exclusionary rule based upon the fifth and sixth amendments excludes
from evidence confessions obtained as a result of coercive police tactics or in
violation of the Miranda warnings. Also predicted upon the sixth amendment
is the exclusionary rule which prohibits the use in evidence of a witness's
pretrial identification of the accused in a police line-up conducted in the
absence of counsel. Three of the exclusionary rules are based upon the federal
supervisory power. Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that arrested persons be heard by the nearest available United States
Commissioner without unnecessary delay. A confession obtained during a
period of unnecessary delay is inadmissible. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3109 prohibits an
officer from opening a door pursuant to the execution of a warrant until he has
been refused admission to the premises. Evidence obtained in violation of this
rule is also inadmissible. The exclusionary rule based upon § 605 of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934 prohibits use of evidence obtained as
a result of unauthorized wiretapping, and has been made applicable to the
states. T. ABBOT, supra note 8 at 12-24.
14 Developments, supra note 8. See also Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion in Harris. He argued that the fifth amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination "is fulfilled only when an accused is guaranteed 'the right
to remain silent, unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
own free will,"' and that if a comment by the prosecution on the defendant's
failure to take the stand "fetters that choice" because "'[i]t cuts down on the
privelege by making its assertion costly,"' the same reasoning leads to the
conclusion that the prosecution's use of a tainted statement to impeach the
defendant also fetters the defendants choice of taking the stand. 401 U.S.
at 232.
15 The Impeachment Exception, supra note 8, at 948.
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would allow the illegal evidence to be admitted, he is prevented from
freely exercising his right to testify in his own defense, and the jury
is denied the benefit of the defendant's testimony. 6 Furthermore,
the impeachment exception violates the basic tenet of the exclusionary
rules which requires the courts to discourage illegal police conduct
by refusing to sanction it. 7 "A court sworn to uphold the law can-
not adequately perform its function if it ignores illegality in the
enforcement of the law.""8 The knowledge that failure to follow
legal procedures absolutely precludes the use of any of the illegally
obtained evidence removes incentive for the police to violate the
laws. On the other hand, the admissibility of illegally obtained
evidence even for the limited purpose of impeachment severely
weakens the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rules, because such
evidence would remain useful to the prosecution. By holding the
evidence in reserve, the prosecution is in a position to discourage
the defendant from testifying in his own defense.' 9 The only measur-
able loss to the judicial system in banning the use of illegal evidence
for impeachment purposes occurs where a guilty person is acquitted
on the basis of his own testimony, which is unlikely since a defendant
in criminal cases is automatically impeached by the jury's knowledge
that he is an interested party and its skepticism of his assertions."0
The holding in Harris does not permit the use of coerced or
involuntary statements for impeachment purposes. To be used for
impeachment, a statement by the accused must satisfy "legal standards
of trustworthiness," even though the Miranda warnings need not be
shown." For instance, if the accused has made a statement under the
influence of lengthy interrogation and police pressure, without being
advised of his right to an appointed attorney during the interrogation,
16 Id. at 944. See State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d. 581, 583 (Ore. 1967).
17 The Impeachment Exception, supra note 8, at 945-46. See also T.
Abbot, supra note 8, at 8-12; 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 772, 777 (1967).
18 Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability and Due Process, 33 U. CHI. L. REv,
719, 752 (1966).
19 "Although the prosecution could not use unlawfully obtained evidence in
its case in chief, such evidence would still be useful to it. By holding the
evidence in reserve, it could place the defendant in a position where he
could: (1) take the stand and tell the 'whole story' knowing full well that
the unlawfully obtained evidence would then be admitted; (2) just deny the
crime without going into detail; or (3) not take the stand at all. Since the
impact on the jury of a weak denial or refusal to testify could be just as
harmful to the defendant as the admission of the evidence, deterrence of
unlawful police activity by the exclusionary rules is seriously weakened." The
Impeachment Exception, supra note 8 at 943-44.
20 Id. at 944.
21 401 U.S. at 224.
[Vol. 74
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the statement could not be used even for impeachment purposes
because it would be characterized as "untrustworthy." However, if
the same statements were voluntarily made by the defendant in
response to interrogation without pressure, it would be admitted for
impeachment even though the full Miranda warnings were not given,
because it would be characterized as "trustworthy." Miranda was an
attempt by the Court to avoid the issues of voluntariness and reliability
by prescribing conditions for lawful police interrogation,22 but it ap-
pears that the Harris decision has re-immersed the courts in the task
of determining the trustworthiness of confessions.
In order for the question of trustworthiness to arise, however,
the court must first have determined at a preliminary hearing or have
had it stipulated at trial that the accused's statement was taken in
violation of Miranda; otherwise, the statement would remain fully
available and no determination of trustworthiness would be neces-
sary.
After a statement has been found to violate Miranda, it would
appear from the Harris case that it remains available for impeachment
purposes, absent any contention of coercion or unreliability by the
defendant. 3 Thus, in order to prevent the prosecutions use of the
statement for impeachment purposes, the defendant would be re-
quired to bring the question of trustworthiness to the attention of
the court. Once the defendant has raised the issue of trustworthiness,
however, the illegal methods of obtaining the confession should give
rise to a presumption that its trustworthiness does not satisfy legal
standards, thereby compelling the prosecution to prove trustworthi-
ness. 4 To hold otherwise would substantially weaken the require-
22 The Impeachment Exception, supra note 9, at 948.
2 3 There is no indication in Harris that the prosecution made an affirmative
showing of trustworthiness before introducing the accused's statements for
impeachment purposes, although it can be inferred from the record that the
statements were in fact trustworthy. For this reason it would appear that the
state need make no affirmative showing of trustworthiness before introducing
illegal statements of the accused for impeachment purposes. The Court said in
Harris: "The transcript of the interrogation used in the impeachment, but
not given to the jury, shows no warning of a right to appointed counsel was
given before questions were put to petitioner when he was taken into custody.
Petitioner makes no claim that the statements made to the police were coerced
or involuntary." 401 U.S. at 224 (emphasis supplied).24 The Miranda warnings must be affirmatively shown by the state before
the statement of the accused is admissible for the prosecution's substantive
case. Although the Miranda requirements need no longer be shown to admit
such statements for impeachment purposes, the same considerations which place
the burden of showing compliance on the state before the use of statements
in its substantive case also exist with respect to showing compliance with
7
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ment of trustworthiness. After the court determines that the statement
satisfies legal standards and it is admitted for impeachment purposes,
the jury must be instructed that prior statements of the accused should
be used only to judge the credibility of the defendant as a witness and
not to judge the defendant's guilt.
No longer must a distinction be made between illegally obtained
evidence which can be characterized as collateral to the elements of
the crime charged and evidence which can be characterized as relating
directly to the elements of the crime charged. For instance, if the de-
fendant in a murder trial takes the stand and denies that he was at the
scene of the crime, the prosecution may then introduce the defendant's
prior exculpatory statement in which he admitted being at the scene of
the crime an hour before the murder but denied participating in the
actual crime. Even though the prosecution could not use this statement
for its case in chief because of some violation of Miranda, it would be
available, provided it met legal standards of trustworthiness, for
impeachment of the defendant's direct testimony. While the court
must instruct the jury not to consider the statement as proof of the
defendant's guilt but only as to his credibility as a witness, it is
doubtful that a jury will draw a distinction between evidence used
to impeach and evidence used to prove a fact in issue.25 As a
result the defendant may be convicted in part on the basis of illegally
obtained statements if they are inconsistent with his direct testimony,
especially if the statement is closely related to a material issue in
legal standards of trustworthiness before the use of statements for impeach-
ment:
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney
and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel. This court has always set high standards of
proof for the waiver of constitutional rights and we re-assert these
standards as applied to in-custody interrogation. Since the State is
responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the
interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available
corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado
interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders.
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of rights
by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado
incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the
accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances
the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is con-
sistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the
interrogation finally forced him to do so. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966) (citations omitted).
25Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its-Effectiveness and Effect, 51
MwNN. L. Rnv. 264 (1966).
[Vol. 74
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the case.26 Thus, the effect of impeachment is much more extensive
in practice than in theory. With the knowledge that the state can
introduce the defendant's illegal statement if he testifies as to matters
contained therein, the real impact of the impeachment exception
may be to keep the defendant from testifying at all.27
Conclusion
Although Harris expressly dealt with impeachment by the use
of illegal statements, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
Harris also permits impeachment of the defendant with evidence
obtained in violation of the other exclusionary rules. The Court in
Harris considered the basic premises underlying all the exclusionary
rules and dismissed them as inapplicable to impeachment. On the
other hand, the reasons advanced by the Court for permitting im-
peachment by the use of Miranda-violative statements apply equally
well to impeachment by evidence obtained in violation of the other
exclusionary rules.2" At, the very least, the Walder impeachment
exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule has been
broadened to include impeachment on matters bearing directly upon
the defendant's guilt.
The practical effect of Harris will be a tendency to keep the
defendant off the stand entirely in most cases where the state has
illegally obtained evidence which can be used to impeach him. Thus,
the Court appears to be cautiously retreating from the full impact
of Miranda.
William F. Dobbs, Jr.
26 In a study of curative instructions and their effect on the jury it was
concluded that an instruction to disregard, instead of preventing the jurors
from considering the evidence, sensitized the jury to the evidence. Broeder,
The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Neb. L. REv. 744, 753-54 (1959).
In a less comprehensive study on the jury's ability to follow instructions it
was found that of eighteen jurors interviewed, only one remembered the
judge's instructions well enough to attempt to follow them. Hoffman &
Bradley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. Rav. 235 (1952). Although both studies
dealt with curative rather than limiting instructions, it. is difficult to escape
the conclusion that juries hiave equal difficulty following limiting instructions.
27 The Impeachment Exception, supra note 8, at 943-44. See State v.
Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 245, 422 P.2d 581, 583 (Ore. 1967): "[A]s com-
mendable as it may be to prevent perjury, the price of such prevention could
be to keep defendants off the stand entirely."
28 401 U.S. at 225, 226.
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